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Note
BONA FIDE PROTECTION: FULFILLING CERCLA’S LEGISLATIVE
PURPOSE BY APPLYING DIFFERING DEFINITIONS OF “DISPOSAL”
EMILEE MOONEY SCOTT
In the late 1970s, the Love Canal disaster brought toxic contamination
into the American consciousness as never before. In response, Congress
passed the Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act of
1980 (“CERCLA”), with the aim of cleaning up contaminated sites and
making the polluters pay. Unfortunately, the draconian liability scheme
imposed by CERCLA has made investors wary of redeveloping possibly
contaminated industrial property. To combat this problem, Congress
passed the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization
Act. The Brownfields Act amends CERCLA to provide liability protection
for landowners who would otherwise be liable, but who did not own the
land in question at the time of disposal of hazardous substances.
Liability protection hinges on whether disposal occurred during the
landowner’s ownership period, but the federal courts of appeal disagree
on the precise meaning of disposal. The prevailing view gives disposal an
expansive meaning, consistent with CERCLA’s legislative purpose but
inconsistent with the amendment meant to encourage redevelopment. In
the 2007 case Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., the U.S.
Supreme Court reiterated the principle that the same word may be
interpreted differently in different parts of the same statutory scheme. This
Note argues that the word “disposal” should be given two different
meanings under CERCLA, to respect the two different sets of
Congressional concerns which shaped its passage.
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BONA FIDE PROTECTION: FULFILLING CERCLA’S LEGISLATIVE
PURPOSE BY APPLYING DIFFERING DEFINITIONS OF “DISPOSAL”
EMILEE MOONEY SCOTT*
I. INTRODUCTION
“Undoubtedly, there is a natural presumption that identical words used
in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same meaning.”1
This presumption, however, is “not rigid and readily yields” when context
so warrants.2 In 2007, the United States Supreme Court reiterated this
point, holding that there is “no effectively irrebuttable presumption that the
same defined term in different provisions of the same statute must be
interpreted identically. Context counts.”3 The context of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response and Liability Act of 1980
(“CERCLA”),4 the statutory scheme that apportions liability for
contaminated land, allows for different definitions of the term “disposal.”
Indeed, CERCLA’s context demands different definitions in order to
respect the legislative intent behind CERCLA and its amendments.
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 with the intention of cleaning up the
nation’s hazardous waste sites, while making polluters pay for the
cleanup.5 Spurred to act by the Love Canal disaster,6 Congress recognized
*
Smith College, A.B. 2005; University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate 2010. I
would like to extend my sincere thanks to Professor Kurt Strasser for his invaluable comments on the
many drafts of this Note. I would also like to thank my father Thomas B. Mooney for his guidance
throughout the writing process, and the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their hard work.
This Note is dedicated to my parents, my sister, and my husband James for their constant love and
support. Any errors contained herein are mine alone.
1
Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427, 433 (1932).
2
Id.
3
Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 575–76 (2007) (citation and internal quotations
omitted).
4
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, Pub. L. No. 96-510,
94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006)).
5
See, e.g., Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings,
Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[CERCLA] was intended, for one, to ‘establish a
comprehensive response and financing mechanism to abate and control the vast problems associated
with abandoned and inactive hazardous waste disposal sites.’ Second, CERCLA was meant to shift the
costs of cleanup to the parties responsible for the contamination.” (citation omitted) (quoting H.R. REP.
NO. 96-1016, at 22 (1980))); Pritikin v. DOE, 254 F.3d 791, 794–95 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that
“CERCLA was enacted to protect and preserve public health and the environment by facilitating the
expeditious and efficient cleanup of hazardous waste sites” (citations and internal quotations omitted));
Richard C. Hula, Changing Priorities and Programs in Toxic Waste Policy: The Emergence of
Economic Development as a Policy Goal, 15 ECON. DEV. Q. 181, 187 (2001) (asserting that CERCLA
was enacted in order to quickly remediate contaminated land and protect public health); see also infra
notes 40–59 and accompanying text.
6
Love Canal was an old canal that was filled with a chemical waste landfill and then covered
with soil and grass, but the name came to refer to the whole neighborhood. See ADELINE GORDON
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that “hazardous waste ha[d] been disposed of throughout the United States
in a manner which has resulted in, and which may in the future result in,
dangerous releases.”7 As a result, CERCLA imposes broad (some would
say “draconian”8) liability for environmental remediation on a wide range
of parties associated with hazardous waste sites, including present owners,
owners at the time of disposal, and those involved in transporting
hazardous waste.9
Meanwhile, through the latter half of the twentieth century, urban areas
lost much of their population and manufacturing base, leaving behind
abandoned factories, warehouses, and the like.10 An estimated 450,00011
of these sites, known as brownfields,12 can be found all over the country.13
Unfortunately, since these sites have the potential to be contaminated with
toxic waste, CERCLA’s broad imposition of liability drives away investors
and discourages redevelopment.14
LEVINE, LOVE CANAL: SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND PEOPLE 11 (1982); see also infra notes 44–50 and
accompanying text.
7
H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 2 (1980); see also id. at 18 (citing a 1979 study by the Environmental
Protection Agency (“EPA”) that “estimated that as many as 30,000 to 50,000 [hazardous waste] sites
existed, of which between 1,200–2,000 present a serious risk to public health”).
8
See, e.g., William Funk, Federal and State Superfunds: Cooperative Federalism or Federal
Preemption, 16 ENVTL. L. 1, 2 (1985) (“Congress included in CERCLA a draconian, retroactive
liability provision applicable to generators, transporters, or land owners with some nexus to the
abandoned hazardous wastes needing cleanup.”); Theodore Waugh, Where Do We Go from Here:
Legal Controls and Future Strategies for Addressing the Transportation of Hazardous Wastes Across
International Borders, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. J. 477, 496 (2000) (“CERCLA’s liability scheme is so
draconian that a generator may seek to export hazardous wastes, in part, as a means of reducing
litigation concerns.”); Peter Niemiec, The Brownfield Blues: Recent Legislation Intended To Promote
the Cleanup and Reuse of Brownfields May Actually Have the Opposite Effect, L.A. LAW., Jan. 2003, at
32 (“[CERCLA’s] draconian liability scheme has brought much financial pain to those who have
bought industrial and commercial properties either before CERCLA’s passage or, afterwards, without
due consideration for the problems they were purchasing.”).
9
See infra notes 65–73 and accompanying text.
10
See infra notes 97–102 and accompanying text.
11
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ROAD MAP TO UNDERSTANDING INNOVATIVE TECHNOLOGY OPTIONS
FOR BROWNFIELDS INVESTIGATION AND CLEANUP 36 (4th ed. 2005), available at
http://www.brownfieldstsc.org/pdfs/Roadmap.pdf; EPA, About Brownfields, http://www.epa.gov/
swerosps/bf/about.htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2010).
12
A “brownfield” is “real property, the expansion, redevelopment, or reuse of which may be
complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazardous substance, pollutant, or contaminant.”
42 U.S.C. § 9601(39)(A) (2006).
13
See generally U.S. CONF. OF MAYORS, RECYCLING AMERICA’S LAND: A NATIONAL REPORT
ON BROWNFIELDS REDEVELOPMENT (2006), available at www.usmayors.org/74thAnnualMeeting/
brownfieldsreport_060506.pdf (presenting the results of a survey of mayors nationwide on brownfields
in their communities).
14
See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 2 (2001) (“The fear of prolonged entanglements in Superfund’s
liability scheme has been reported by some to be an impediment to the cleanup of even lightly
contaminated sites, today known as brownfields.”); Todd S. Davis, Defining the Brownfields Problem,
in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 3, 13
(Todd S. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002) (“The environmental and liability issues surrounding brownfields
have had the same chilling effect on real estate developers and lenders that the movie Jaws has had on
swimmers. We know the sharks are out there. And as is the case with certain sharks, some
environmental liabilities will eat you alive.”); Kris Wernstedt et al., The Brownfields Phenomenon:
Much Ado About Something or the Timing of the Shrewd? 2 (Resources for the Future, Discussion

2010]

CERCLA: APPLYING DIFFERING DEFINITIONS TO “DISPOSAL”

961

In an attempt to encourage the redevelopment of brownfields,15
Congress enacted the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act of 2002 (“Brownfields Act”).16 The Brownfields Act
amended CERCLA to give brownfield redevelopers protection from
liability as long as “[a]ll disposal of hazardous substances at the facility
occurred before [they] acquired the facility”17 and other conditions are
satisfied.18 While many commentators have expressed hope that the
Brownfields Act will fulfill its goal of encouraging brownfield
redevelopment,19 others have noted that the Act leaves many unanswered
questions and potential liability traps that may impair its usefulness.20 The
complexity and ambiguity of CERCLA’s liability scheme, even after the
passage of the Brownfields Act, continues to hinder brownfield
redevelopment.21
This Note addresses one such ambiguity: the proper definition of the
word “disposal.”22 The definition of “disposal” is critical because
protection as a bona fide prospective purchaser or innocent landowner
depends upon whether disposal has occurred in the party’s ownership
period. The federal circuit courts disagree as to what, precisely, “disposal”
means, with the disagreement centering on the issue of how much human

Paper 04–46), available at www.rff.org/RFF/Documents/RFF-DP-04-46.pdf (“As a result of
[CERCLA], owners and prospective buyers of properties thought to be contaminated are leery of
attracting regulatory attention and becoming responsible for cleanup.”); Flannary P. Collins, Note, The
Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act: A Critique, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. &
POL’Y F. 303, 309 (2003) (asserting that CERCLA “caused potential developers to shy away from
redeveloping brownfield sites due to ambiguous liability and uncertain litigation and cleanup costs”);
Julia A. Solo, Comment, Urban Decay and the Role of Superfund: Legal Barriers to Redevelopment
and Prospects for Change, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 285, 286 (1995) (arguing that “it has become clear that
Superfund has also had a number of unintended effects, the most serious being to dissuade industry
from redeveloping on former industrial land” (citations omitted)).
15
See infra notes 113–66 and accompanying text (discussing the legislative history of the
Brownfields Act).
16
Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act, Pub. L. No. 107-118, 115
Stat. 2356 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006)).
17
42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A).
18
See infra notes 135–66 and accompanying text.
19
See Collins, supra note 14, at 328; Amy Pilat McMorrow, Note, CERCLA Liability Redefined:
An Analysis of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act and Its Impact on
State Voluntary Cleanup Programs, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 1087, 1089 (2004).
20
See Niemiec, supra note 8, at 36.
21
See C. GREGORY ROGERS, FINANCIAL REPORTING OF ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES AND RISKS
AFTER SARBANES-OXLEY 38 (2005) (“With [CERCLA’s] potentially costly and ambiguous liability,
businesses often choose the safety of suburban locations over inner-city brownfields.”).
22
This ambiguity has been identified by others. See, e.g., Dale A. Guariglia et al., The Small
Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act: Real Relief or Prolonged Pain?, 32
ENVTL. L. REP. 10,505, 10,507 (2002) (“The meaning of ‘disposal’ may vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction, and a broad construction could result in a violation of the condition if, for example, the
purchased property contains leaching contaminants, or contaminants leaking from buried drums or
tanks.”).
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23

agency is required. This disagreement becomes especially important in
situations involving, for example, a leaking drum hidden somewhere on the
property. According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit, a leak in a buried tank or drum constitutes “disposal” under
CERCLA even if the landowner is unaware of the drum’s very existence.24
The Sixth Circuit, by contrast, has held that disposal requires “evidence
that there was human activity involved in whatever movement of
hazardous substances occurred on the property.”25 The Second,26 Third,27
and Ninth28 Circuits have not directly commented on the issue, but have
suggested that they would agree with the Fourth Circuit. Hundreds of
thousands of brownfields have not yet been identified and remediated29 and
a substantial number of these sites likely contain leaky underground
storage tanks or drums.30
To a prospective brownfield developer, a leaky drum could thus
become a landmine of liability. While there are a number of state and
federal programs that encourage brownfield redevelopment through grants
and technical assistance,31 relief from CERCLA liability could provide
23
For previous commentators’ discussion of the circuit split over the precise meaning of the word
“disposal” under CERCLA, see generally Khara Coleman, Note, Disposing of Leaks and Spills:
Passive Disposal of Hazardous Wastes Under CERCLA, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 945 (2002); see also
generally Ranen Schechner, Note, Putting the Remedial Cart Before the Statutory Horse: The Ninth
Circuit Reopens Debate on CERCLA’s Definition of Disposal, 29 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 69 (2001)
(discussing how the Ninth Circuit has reopened the debate); Jasmine M. Starr, Note, Making Good
Neighbors: Liability for Passive Migration of Hazardous Waste Under CERCLA, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q.
435 (2004) (arguing that a narrow definition of disposal is inappropriate).
24
See Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); see also
infra notes 193–207 and accompanying text.
25
See United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 706 (6th Cir. 2000); see also infra notes
208–13 and accompanying text.
26
See Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem., Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2003); see
also infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
27
See United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711 (3d Cir. 1996); see also infra notes
214–18 and accompanying text.
28
See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra
notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
29
In 2004, the EPA estimated that approximately 217,000 hazardous waste sites would be
discovered in the coming decades. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEANING UP THE NATION’S WASTE
SITES: MARKETS AND TECHNOLOGY TRENDS 1-4 (2004), available at http://www.clu-in.org/download/
market/2004market.pdf. This estimate was based on the rate of new site discoveries in the 1990s and
beginning of this decade and “assumes that EPA will add new sites to the [National Priorities List] for
another [ten] years, [underground storage tank] site discoveries will continue for [ten] years, and new
state and private party site discoveries will continue for [thirty] years.” Id. at viii, 1-4.
30
While the number of undiscovered leaky drums or tanks is necessarily uncertain, the EPA
estimates that 100,000 to 200,000 of the approximately 450,000 brownfield sites nationwide may
contain abandoned underground storage tanks. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ROAD MAP, supra note 11, at
36. The EPA estimates that 90,000 new sites with leaking underground storage tanks will arise or be
discovered between 2004 and 2013. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CLEANING UP, supra note 29, at 1-5.
31
See generally TODD S. DAVIS, BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING
CONTAMINATED PROPERTY (2d ed. 2002) (detailing brownfields programs in numerous states); John
Stainback, The Public/Private Finance of Redevelopment, in REDEVELOPMENT: PLANNING, LAW, AND
PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 155 (Brian W. Blaesser & Thomas P. Cody eds., 2008) (discussing
opportunities for public/private partnerships in redevelopment projects); Julianne Kurdila & Elise
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32

even more encouragement. In a 2004 study, Resources for the Future
showed that brownfield redevelopers found “the value of liability relief for
future cleanups [to be] strongly positive” even if it came with additional
community and agency involvement.33 Nine years after the passage of the
Brownfields Act, it is still unclear what type of disposal would render a
party ineligible for protection as a bona fide prospective purchaser, making
the defense less useful in encouraging cleanups.
The concept of “disposal” has two distinct functions in CERCLA, so
there is room for the Fourth Circuit’s expansive interpretation of “disposal”
to coexist with the Sixth Circuit’s more limited interpretation. The first
function of the word “disposal” is in determining which past owners of a
site can be held liable for current contamination, as owners at the time of
disposal. The more expansive interpretation of disposal favored by the
Fourth Circuit34 should be used for this function, because it is consistent
with CERCLA’s original legislative purpose. In 1980, “Congress cast the
liability net wide to capture all potentially responsible parties.”35 Courts
have been mindful of this congressional goal, holding that due to
CERCLA’s comprehensive remedial intent, courts are bound to “construe
its provisions liberally to avoid frustrating the legislature’s purpose.”36
The second function of the word “disposal” is to protect those who
Rindfleisch, Funding Opportunities for Brownfield Redevelopment, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 479
(2007) (describing governmental and non-governmental sources of funding); James A. Kushner,
Brownfield Redevelopment Strategies in the United States, 22 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 857 (2006)
(describing programs that encourage brownfield redevelopment and urban revitalization); Scott
Sherman, Government Tax and Financial Incentives in Brownfields Redevelopment: Inside the
Developer’s Pro Forma, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 317 (2003) (describing tax-based brownfields
incentives); ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS FEDERAL PROGRAM GUIDE (2005), available at
www.epa.gov/brownfields/partners/2005_fpg.pdf (describing federal brownfields programs); EPA,
Brownfields and Land Revitalization: Grants & Funding, http://epa.gov/brownfields/grant_info/index.
htm (last visited Jan. 13, 2010) (providing information on funding sources).
32
See Wernstedt et al., supra note 14, at 13 (“[T]he relative effectiveness of nonfinancial
interventions—a change in regulatory requirements such as reducing cleanup standards or liability
relief that releases ‘innocent’ parties at contaminated sites from long-term damage claims—may be
even more critical.”).
33
Id. at 17.
34
Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); see also infra
notes 193–207 and accompanying text.
35
Horsehead Indus. Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 258 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2001).
36
Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 677
(4th Cir. 1995); see also, e.g., Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir.
2004) (“We agree with Sierra Club’s assertion that CERCLA . . . must be interpreted liberally so as to
accomplish its remedial goals.”); Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir.
1996) (“We note that because CERCLA is remedial legislation, it should be construed liberally to carry
out its purpose.”); United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989)
(“[C]ourts have concluded that a liberal judicial interpretation is consistent with CERCLA’s
overwhelmingly remedial statutory scheme.” (citations omitted)); United States v. Northeastern Pharm.
& Chem. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986) (“We believe requiring proof of personal
ownership or actual physical possession of hazardous substances as a precondition for liability under
CERCLA § 107(a)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3), would be inconsistent with the broad remedial purposes
of CERCLA.”).
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intend to redevelop brownfields, shielding current owners from liability as
long as “disposal” stopped before the property was acquired. While the
expansive definition of disposal is consistent with CERCLA as a whole, it
is completely inconsistent with the legislative goal of the Brownfields Act.
The goal of the Brownfields Act was to encourage brownfield
redevelopment by providing a safe harbor from liability.37 Senator Barbara
Boxer articulated the Brownfield Act’s purpose to protect “people who are
interested in cleaning up [a] brownfield site” but “afraid to get involved
because they may become liable for somebody else’s mess.”38 It does not
make any sense to condition liability protection on a definition of disposal
designed to spread liability as far as possible. Thus, the limited
interpretation of disposal favored by the Sixth Circuit39 is more appropriate
in the context of the bona fide prospective purchaser and innocent
landowner defenses. This Note discusses the meaning of disposal under
CERCLA with reference to the political circumstances and legislative
intentions behind CERCLA and the Brownfields Act. Part II of this Note
describes the emergence of hazardous waste as a public policy issue, and
outlines CERCLA’s liability scheme. Part III describes the brownfields
issue and the CERCLA amendment that intended to encourage brownfield
redevelopment. Part IV examines the case law on the definition of
“disposal” and contrasts the Fourth Circuit’s expansive interpretation with
the Sixth Circuit’s more limited interpretation. Finally, Part V reconciles
the two definitions of disposal and concludes that while the passive
definition favored by a majority of the circuits is more consistent with
CERCLA’s general remedial purpose, the active definition favored by the
Sixth Circuit is more appropriate for protected landowners.
II. CONTAMINATED LAND AND THE LIABILITY SCHEME UNDER CERCLA
A. Contaminated Land in the United States
During the twentieth century, the United States grew and industrialized
rapidly. As society industrialized, waste products became “ever more toxic
and persistent” and required more secure means of disposal.40 While
technological solutions were developed, they lagged somewhat behind the
demands of industry and society.41 By mid-century, engineers recognized
that “growth, urbanization, and industrial expansion in the United States
37
For a discussion of the historical and political circumstances that led to the Brownfields Act’s
passage, see infra notes 97–122 and accompanying text.
38
147 Cong. Rec. 6241 (2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
39
United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705–06 (6th Cir. 2000). For a more detailed
discussion of the case, see infra notes 208–13 and accompanying text.
40
CRAIG E. COLTEN & PETER N. SKINNER, THE ROAD TO LOVE CANAL: MANAGING INDUSTRIAL
WASTE BEFORE EPA 3 (1996).
41
Id.
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[had] created major waste disposal problems.”
Concern for water
supplies led to water pollution controls, which in turn encouraged landbased disposal of toxic substances.43 Land-based disposal, of course,
creates its own set of problems.
Love Canal gained infamy as a result of its use as a toxic substances
landfill. As was common at the time, the Hooker Electrochemical
Company disposed of its chemical waste by burying drums in a landfill
that it had constructed in an old canal.44 In the mid-1950s, Hooker covered
the site with dirt and grass and sold it to the local school board.45 A school
was completed in 1955, and a modest residential neighborhood grew
around the school.46 Every so often the residents would smell noxious
odors or suffer skin irritation after coming in contact with the soil, but they
complained very little for about twenty years.47 Then the Niagara Falls
area experienced a period of heavier than usual rainfall, and the toxic brew
of Love Canal began seeping into nearby basements.48 In the summer of
1978, the New York State Commissioner of Health declared that, in his
opinion, the waste at Love Canal presented a “great and imminent peril to
the health of the general public residing at or near the site.”49 By the
summer of 1981, hundreds of families had left the area, their unsellable
homes having been purchased by the State.50
The Love Canal disaster brought toxic waste disposal into the public
consciousness as never before.51 After six years of fruitless attempts to
enact legislation addressing liability for the release of hazardous
substances,52 public attention on Love Canal provided the catalyst for
congressional action.53 CERCLA54 was signed into law by President
42

Gerald Meyer, Geological and Hydrologic Aspects of Stabilization Ponds, 32 J. WATER
POLLUTION CONTROL FED’N 820, 820 (1960).
43
COLTEN & SKINNER, supra note 40, at 68.
44
LEVINE, supra note 6, at 10–11.
45
Id. at 11–12.
46
Id. at 12–13.
47
Id. at 14–15.
48
Id. at 15.
49
Id. at 7.
50
Id. at 213.
51
See, e.g., COLTEN & SKINNER, supra note 40, at 1 (noting that while the Love Canal disaster
means different things to different groups of people, it “has been seared into the collective memory of
the country”).
52
CAROLE STERN SWITZER & PETER GRAY, CERCLA: COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL
RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT (SUPERFUND) 5 (2d ed. 2008).
53
Id. at 3; see also COLTEN & SKINNER, supra note 40, at 160 (calling Love Canal “the virtual
birthplace of the Superfund legislation”). The fact that the 1980 election had resulted in the Democrats
losing control of the White House and the Senate also moved them to act while they were still in
power. SWITZER & GRAY, supra note 52, at 8.
54
Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675
(2006)). For a detailed contemporary account of the circumstances surrounding CERCLA’s passage,
see generally Frank P. Grad, A Legislative History of the Comprehensive Environmental Responses,
Compensation and Liability (“Superfund”) Act of 1980, 8 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (1982).
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Carter on December 11, 1980, as the relocation of Love Canal residents
was still in progress.55
CERCLA complemented the Resources
Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 (“RCRA”),56 providing the
“second part” of the federal law addressing hazardous substances.57 On the
day CERCLA was signed into law, Representative Florio remarked that
RCRA would prevent any new Love Canals, and CERCLA would provide
for the remediation of toxic contamination that had already occurred.58
Calling it “landmark in its scope and in its impact on preserving the
environmental quality of our country,” President Carter said that CERCLA
would begin a “massive and a needed cleanup of hazardous wastes[,] . . . a
problem that had been neglected for decades or even generations.”59
B. CERCLA Liability
CERCLA, as originally written, is fundamentally a public health
statute, with the goal of preventing human exposure to toxic substances
The “polluter pays”
through remediation of contaminated sites.60
principle61 forms the philosophical core of CERCLA’s approach.62 Under
the polluter pays principle, the goal is to “place the ultimate responsibility
for the clean-up of hazardous waste on those responsible for problems
55

26.

See Ralph Blumenthal, Many from Love Canal Still Unsettled, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 1981, at

56
42 U.S.C. §§ 6901–6992k (2006); see also City of Chi. v. Envtl. Def. Fund, 511 U.S. 328, 331
(1994) (“RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute that empowers EPA to regulate hazardous
wastes from cradle to grave, in accordance with the rigorous safeguards and waste management
procedures . . . .”).
57
President Jimmy Carter, Remarks on Signing H.R. 7020 into Law (Dec. 11, 1980), available at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=44392 (statement by Rep. James Florio).
58
Id. Two commentators described the difference between CERCLA and RCRA as follows: “If
RCRA can be thought of as managing a hazardous substance from its cradle to its grave, Superfund is
the fail-safe device should the substance rise from the dead.” James F. Vernon & Patrick W. Dennis,
Hazardous-Substance Generator, Transporter and Disposer Liability Under the Federal and
California Superfunds, 2 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 67, 73 (1981).
59
Carter, supra note 57.
60
Hula, supra note 5, at 187; see also United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51, 55 (1998) (stating
that Congress enacted CERCLA in order to remedy “serious environmental and health risks posed by
industrial pollution”); Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d
669, 677 (4th Cir. 1995) (“Congress enacted CERCLA to protect public health and the environment
from inactive hazardous waste sites.”).
61
See generally Michael J. Gergen, The Failed Promise of the “Polluter Pays” Principle: An
Economic Analysis of Landowner Liability for Hazardous Waste, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 624 (1994); Eric
Thomas Larson, Why Environmental Liability Regimes in the United States, the European Community,
and Japan Have Grown Synonymous with the Polluter Pays Principle, 38 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 541
(2005).
62
“Most important[ly], [CERCLA] enables the Government to recover from responsible parties
the costs of their actions in the disposal of toxic wastes.” Carter, supra note 57. Some commentators
have criticized CERCLA for failing to apply the polluter pays principle in an appropriate and effective
way. See, e.g., Hongkyun Kim, Is the Korean Soil Environment Conservation Act’s Liability Too
Severe?: Learning from CERCLA, 11 ALB. L. ENVTL. OUTLOOK 1, 29–30 (asserting that CERCLA
“distorts the polluter pays principle” in that it “can be interpreted to impose liability on parties with
virtually no nexus to the contamination”).
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63

caused by the disposal of chemical poison.” As such, CERCLA imposes
broad liability on a wide range of parties associated with contaminated
sites. This liability arises without regard to relative culpability, and the
available defenses at the time of CERCLA’s passage were extremely
limited.64
Section 107(a) of CERCLA65 imposes strict liability66 upon classes
known as potentially responsible parties for costs associated with the
release or threatened release67 of hazardous substances.68 To establish a
prima facie case for cost recovery under CERCLA section 107(a), a
plaintiff must prove four elements: “(1) the site is a ‘facility’;[69] (2) a
release or threatened release of hazardous substance has occurred; (3) the
release has caused the plaintiff to incur ‘necessary costs of response’
consistent with the [National Contingency Plan (“NCP”)];[70] and (4) the
defendant falls within one of the four categories of potentially responsible
parties.”71 The four groups of potentially responsible parties (“PRPs”)
include: (1) the current owner or operator of the facility; (2) the owner or
operator of the facility at the time that any hazardous substances were
disposed of; (3) any person who arranged for disposal, treatment, or
transportation of hazardous substances; and (4) any person who transported
hazardous substances to the facility.72 As CERCLA is a comprehensive
63

Florida Power & Light Co. v. Allis Chalmers Corp., 893 F.2d 1313, 1317 (11th Cir. 1990)
(citation omitted).
64
See infra notes 86–87 and accompanying text.
65
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
66
While the statute does not explicitly say that CERCLA imposes strict liability, it has been
consistently interpreted as such by the courts. See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v.
N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he EPA may recover its
costs in full from any responsible party, regardless of that party’s relative fault.”); City of Wichita v.
Aero Holdings, Inc., 177 F. Supp. 2d 1153, 1164 (D. Kan. 2000) (“Fault or culpability is irrelevant
under CERCLA’s statutory scheme.”).
67
“Release” is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22) (2006) to include “any spilling, leaking,
pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or
disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and
other closed receptacles containing any hazardous substance or pollutant or contaminant),” but
excluding occupational exposure, motor vehicle emissions, and nuclear accidents. This Note does not
examine what constitutes a “release” under CERCLA, as the term is so broad as to encompass virtually
any movement of contaminants within a site. As the definition of “release” includes the word
“disposing,” courts have taken the term “release” to describe a wider range of situations than
“disposal.”
68
“Hazardous substance” is defined by 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (2006) to include substances
designated as hazardous by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(2)(A) (1994),
the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6921 (2006), the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006),
the Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2606 (2006), and any other toxic substances the EPA
may deem hazardous under 42 U.S.C. § 9602 (2006). For purposes of this Note, “hazardous substance”
is any substance deemed to be hazardous under CERCLA.
69
42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2006).
70
42 U.S.C. § 9605 (2006).
71
Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 534,
541 (6th Cir. 2001).
72
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2006).
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remedial statutory scheme, courts typically construe its provisions liberally
to avoid frustrating the legislature’s purpose.73
Courts consistently impose joint and several liability under
CERCLA,74 but Congress did not specify joint and several liability in the
statute.75 Rather, Congress intended for the “scope of liability [to be]
determined under common law principles, where a court performing a
case-by-case evaluation of the complex factual scenarios associated with
multiple-generator waste sites will assess the propriety of applying joint
and several liability on an individual basis.”76 In United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., the Third Circuit examined the Restatement (Second) of
Torts to determine which rules of liability should be applied:77 “[W]here
joint tortfeasors cause a single and indivisible harm for which there is no
reasonable basis for division according to the contribution of each, each
tortfeasor is subject to liability for the entire harm.”78
When multiple entities have owned or operated a site for a number of
years, it is often difficult to determine who is responsible for the harm and
precisely how much harm each entity caused, so joint and several liability
is applied.79 When it is possible to discern which harms were caused by
which defendant, it is appropriate to apportion the cleanup costs between
defendants.80 In such cases, the defendant bears the burden of showing
that the costs are capable of apportionment.81 CERCLA’s joint and several
liability provision allows a plaintiff82 to hold one party with deep pockets
73
See Atl. Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1996); Westfarm
Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 677 (4th Cir. 1995); United
States v. Carolina Transformer Co., 978 F.2d 832, 838 (4th Cir. 1992); United States v. Aceto Agric.
Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986); Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074,
1081 (1st Cir. 1986); see also infra notes 226–37 and accompanying text.
74
See, e.g., United States v. Atl. Research Corp., 551 U.S. 128, 137 n.7 (2007) (“We assume
without deciding that §107(a) provides for joint and several liability.”).
75
See United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 268 (3d Cir. 1992) (“[B]oth the
House and Senate deleted provisions imposing joint and several liability from their respective versions
of the statute before its enactment.”).
76
United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983).
77
Alcan Aluminium Corp., 964 F.2d at 268.
78
Id. at 268–69.
79
See Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc.,
473 F.3d 824, 827 n.3 (7th Cir. 2007) (noting that it is possible to establish divisibility, but that it is “a
rare scenario”).
80
See Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d at 268 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A
(1977)).
81
See id. at 269 n.28 (“‘Where the tortious conduct of two or more actors has combined to bring
about harm to the plaintiff, and one or more of the actors seeks to limit his liability on the ground that
the harm is capable of apportionment among them, the burden of proof as to the apportionment is upon
each such actor.’” (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B(2) (1977))).
82
The plaintiff is often the EPA. See, e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apts., 94 F.3d
1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996). Private parties may also be CERCLA plaintiffs. See Joanna M. Fuller,
Note, The Sanctity of Settlement: Stopping CERCLA’s Volunteer Remediators from Sidestepping the
Settlement Bar, 34 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 219, 233–38 (2009) (detailing the two causes of action—cost
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83

responsible for the entire cost of cleanup, even if there are other viable
parties who were responsible.84 In that case, the defendant can bring cost
recovery actions against other PRPs to recover some of its costs.85
Before 1986, the available defenses under CERCLA were quite
limited. Section 107(b) provided that a potentially responsible party would
not be held liable if it could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
the release or threatened release was caused solely by an act of God, an act
of war, or “an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or
agent of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in
connection with a contractual relationship . . . with the defendant.”86 In the
early 1980s, landowners who had purchased land from the original polluter
were ineligible for the third party defense, because a “contractual
relationship” had been created by the instrument conveying the property.87
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(“SARA”)88 relaxed liability slightly for the first time, offering protection
to so-called “innocent landowners.”89 Concerned with the fairness of the
system, Congress intended for the amendment to make clear that “under
limited circumstances landowners who acquire property without knowing
of any contamination at the site and without reason to know of any
contamination . . . may have a defense to liability.”90 Representative
Barney Frank, the sponsor of the amendment, said that “nothing can be
more damaging to our efforts” to make CERCLA work properly than a
scheme “that could inadvertently sweep out within its coils innocent
individuals.”91
SARA made the innocent landowner defense available to those who
had purchased already-contaminated land by clarifying the meaning of
“contractual relationship” in 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A). The statute now
recovery and contribution—available under CERCLA for volunteer remediators who wish to recover
their costs).
83
See Gergen, supra note 61, at 673–76 (1994) (discussing the inefficiencies caused by the
common practice of going after “deep pockets” for remediation costs).
84
See N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings, Inc., 473 F.3d at 827 (“[B]y invoking § 107(a), the EPA
may recover its costs in full from any responsible party, regardless of that party’s relative fault.”).
85
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(1) (2006). Such actions allow PRPs “who are liable for some of the
cleanup costs, but have paid more than their fair share of those costs, to recover the amount of their
excess payments from other parties who are also responsible for the pollution.” Blasland, Bouck &
Lee, Inc. v. City of N. Miami, 283 F.3d 1286, 1302 (11th Cir. 2002).
86
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (1982). Only the third party defense will be analyzed in this Note, as the
act of God and act of war defenses have very seldom been used.
87
MICHAEL B. GERRARD & JOEL M. GROSS, AMENDING CERCLA: THE POST-SARA
AMENDMENTS TO THE COMPREHENSIVE ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION, AND LIABILITY
ACT 44 (2006).
88
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613
(1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2006)).
89
See 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b)(3) (providing a defense to landowners who can show they had no
reason to know a property was contaminated prior to holding title).
90
H.R. REP. NO. 99-962, at 186 (1986) (Conf. Rep.).
91
131 CONG. REC. 34715 (1985) (statement of Rep. Frank).
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provides that a “contractual relationship” does not include instruments
transferring title or possession if the defendant acquired the facility after
the disposal of the hazardous materials and purchased the land without
knowing or having any reason to know of the contamination.92 In order to
gain protection as an innocent landowner, the landowner must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that he did not cause the pollution himself93
and he must show that he was not aware of the pollution at the time of
purchase.94 Additionally, he must show that he took due care with respect
to the pollution and that he took “precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of . . . third part[ies].”95 In order to establish that he had no
reason to know of the contamination, the landowner must have conducted
“all appropriate inquiries”96 into the history of the site prior to purchase.
III. BROWNFIELDS AND THE 2002 AMENDMENTS
A. Deindustrialization and Brownfields
Even as the Love Canal crisis and Superfund debates were occurring,
the face of America’s industrial cities was changing. Manufacturers
moved overseas,97 to different regions of the United States,98 or to
suburban industrial parks that offered more room for expansion.99
Between the early 1960s and the early 1980s, the United States’ share of
global manufactured exports dropped from twenty-five percent to less than
seventeen percent.100 Many factories shut down,101 and abandoned
industrial properties dotted the landscape of American cities.102
92
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A) (2006). A purchaser who acquires land after disposal is also protected
if it is a government entity that acquired the land through escheat, tax default or eminent domain, or
acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest. Id.
93
Id. § 9607(b).
94
Id. § 9601(35)(A).
95
Id. § 9607(b).
96
All appropriate inquiries are discussed in more detail infra notes 140–49 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of what “all appropriate inquiries” means in practice, see generally Michelle
Weiler, The Environmental Protection Agency’s New Standard for CERCLA All Appropriate Inquiry,
14 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 159 (2007); Nancy A. Mangone, Brownfields Redevelopment: A Practitioners
Guide to EPA’s “All Appropriate Inquiries” Rule, 43 ARIZ. ATT’Y 32 (2006), available at
http://www.myazbar.org/AZAttorney/PDF_Articles/1206Brown1.pdf.
97
See BARRY BLUESTONE & BENNETT HARRISON, THE DEINDUSTRIALIZATION OF AMERICA 6
(1982) (citing the example of General Electric, which in the 1970s added 30,000 foreign jobs and cut
25,000 domestic jobs).
98
See id. at 164–70 (discussing the movement of manufacturing out of the Northeast and Midwest
and into the South and Plains states, where unionization is less common and labor costs are lower).
99
See Mark D. Bjelland, Brownfield Sites in Minneapolis–St. Paul: The Interwoven Geographies
of Industrial Disinvestment and Environmental Contamination, 25 URB. GEOGRAPHY 631, 639–40
(2004).
100
BLUESTONE & HARRISON, supra note 97, at 5.
101
See id. at 9.
102
See JENNIFER S. VEY, RESTORING PROSPERITY: THE STATE ROLE IN REVITALIZING
AMERICA’S OLDER INDUSTRIAL CITIES 23 (2007), available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/
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These abandoned industrial properties have come to symbolize urban
neglect and decay,103 and have caused a number of problems for the
communities in which they are located. Brownfields may lower property
values, both by being aesthetically unattractive and by stigmatizing the
nearby area as environmentally contaminated.104 When an industrial site is
abandoned, waste control strategies that may have succeeded with
maintenance fall into disrepair, making the release of hazardous substances
more likely.105 Brownfields also raise a host of environmental justice
concerns, as they are more likely to be located in depressed, urban, and
disproportionally minority areas.106 Brownfield redevelopment provides a
two-fold benefit: “an opportunity to both reverse the decay of already
developed areas and slow unsustainable development trends throughout the
country.”107
While some contaminated land was addressed through CERCLA
during its first decade, there were more sites than legislators had

Files/rc/reports/2007/05metropolitanpolicy_vey/20070520_oic.pdf (“[D]eindustrialization has left a
tremendous environmental legacy, manifested in the large numbers of contaminated parcels that scar
older industrial cities’ waterfronts and urban cores.”).
103
See KARL LINN, URBAN HABITAT PROGRAM, FROM RUBBLE TO RESTORATION 2 (1991) (“The
loss of an economic base has left many cities with extensive areas of unused land. Acre upon acre of
vacant litter strewn land symbolizes many cities as places of desolation and decay in the minds of
residents and visitors alike.”); Paul Stanton Kibel, The Urban Nexus: Open Space, Brownfields, and
Justice, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 589, 598 (1998) (“The vision of the vacant urban lot embodies
most of the elements commonly associated with the decline of our cities: pollution and garbage,
unemployment, poverty, racial isolation, crime, drugs, declining public services, and architectural
eyesores.”); Heidi Gorovitz Robertson, One Piece of the Puzzle: Why State Brownfields Programs
Can’t Lure Businesses to the Urban Cores Without Finding the Missing Pieces, 51 RUTGERS L. REV.
1075, 1078 (1999).
104
See Dennis A. Kaufman & Norman R. Cloutier, The Impact of Small Brownfields and
Greenspaces on Residential Property Values, 33 J. REAL ESTATE FINAN. ECON. 19, 25–29 (2006)
(using empirical results to examine the impact of brownfields on property values in Kenosha,
Wisconsin and finding that brownfield remediation would raise the total property value in a single
neighborhood by between $1.19 and $4.31 million).
105
See COLTEN & SKINNER, supra note 40, at 147; Douglas A. McWilliams, Environmental
Justice and Industrial Redevelopment: Economics and Equality in Urban Revitalization, 21 ECOLOGY
L.Q. 705, 717 (1994).
106
See Nancy Perkins, A Tale of Two Brownfield Sites: Making the Best of Times from the Worst
of Times in Western Pennsylvania’s Steel Valley, 34 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 503, 520–32. For
further discussion of brownfields and environmental justice, see Stephen M. Johnson, The Brownfields
Action Agenda: A Model for Future Federal/State Cooperation in the Quest for Environmental
Justice?, 37 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 85, 95 (1996); Lincoln L. Davies, Note, Working Toward a
Common Goal? Three Case Studies of Brownfields Redevelopment in Environmental Justice
Communities, 18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 285, 288 (1999); William T. D. Freeland, Note, Environmental
Justice and the Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2001: Brownfields of Dreams or a Nightmare in the
Making, 8 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 183, 187 (2004).
107
Wernstedt et al., supra note 14, at 4; see also JONATHAN P. DEASON ET AL., PUBLIC POLICIES
AND PRIVATE DECISIONS AFFECTING THE REDEVELOPMENT OF BROWNFIELDS: AN ANALYSIS OF
CRITICAL FACTORS, RELATIVE WEIGHTS AND AREAL DIFFERENTIALS, at ch. 5 (2001), available at
http://www.gwu.edu/~eem/Brownfields/project_report/report.htm (finding that the redevelopment of
one acre of brownfield land may prevent the development of an average of 4.5 acres of as-yet
undeveloped “greenfield” land).
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anticipated, and they were taking longer than expected to clean up.108
Additionally, CERCLA’s role as a public health statute made it ill-suited to
address sites with low or uncertain levels of contamination. In the 1980s
and 1990s, policy makers began to turn their attention toward brownfields,
the industrial sites that were not heavily contaminated enough to be
remediation priorities under CERCLA.109 States began to institute
voluntary cleanup programs, which allow landowners to remediate their
property voluntarily, in exchange for liability protection and less stringent
cleanup standards.110 In 1993, the Environmental Protection Agency
(“EPA”) began its “Brownfield Initiative” with a pilot grant to Cuyahoga
County, Ohio.111 Congress began funding the EPA Brownfields program
through earmarks in the annual Superfund appropriation in 1997.112
Proponents of brownfield revitalization criticized CERCLA, arguing
that its expansive net of liability discouraged developers from dealing with
environmentally compromised land.113 The EPA is not involved in the
typical brownfield cleanup, but the specter of CERCLA liability looms and
drives away investors.114 Under CERCLA (as originally written) if
contamination was discovered after an investor purchased a site, he could
be held liable for the whole cost of a CERCLA clean up, even if he had
absolutely nothing to do with the placement of the contamination on the
site.115 This makes investment in brownfield land that much more risky
than investment in other land, and thus less attractive to investors.
In 2001, a bipartisan group of senators endorsed CERCLA
amendments that limited liability and encouraged brownfield
redevelopment.116 Senator Bob Smith, a Republican from New Hampshire,
108

Id.

See S. REP. NO. 105-192, at 2 (1998).
When the law was first enacted, it was expected that only a few hundred sites would
require Federal attention and that cleanups could be accomplished with relatively
limited Federal funding. Almost 41,000 sites, however, have been included on
EPA’s national inventory of hazardous waste sites, the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Information System
(CERCLIS).

109
See Ira Whitman, Overcoming Environmental Constraints to Redevelopment, in
REDEVELOPMENT: PLANNING, LAW, AND PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION 175, 202 (Brian W. Blaesser &
Thomas P. Cody eds., 2008); Hula, supra note 5, at 192.
110
Hula, supra note 5, at 192.
111
Jonathan D. Weiss, Federal Brownfields Initiatives, in BROWNFIELDS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO REDEVELOPING CONTAMINATED PROPERTY 43, 50 (Todd S. Davis ed., 2d ed. 2002).
112
H.R. REP. NO. 109-616, at 3 (2006).
113
See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
114
See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, BROWNFIELDS HANDBOOK: HOW TO MANAGE FEDERAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY RISKS 10 (2002).
115
See supra notes 65–85 and accompanying text.
116
See 147 CONG. REC. 6232, 6232–33 (2001) (statement of Sen. Inhofe) (expressing a desire that
businesses “feel adequately protected” and invest in brownfield redevelopment); 147 CONG. REC. 6242
(2001) (statement of Sen. Carnahan) (“By providing liability protection and economic incentives to
clean up contaminated and abandoned industrial sites, this legislation will make our communities
healthier and reduce environmental threats.”); Id. at 6242 (statement of Sen. Lieberman) (noting that
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touted Senate Bill 350, which would later become the part of the
Brownfields Act,117 saying:
What this does is it limits the liability and brings us
closer to finality in cleanup so we can now get contractors to
go on these sites. They can get the insurance, they can take
the risk, and they are not going to be held accountable if a
hot spot or some other problem that was not their fault
occurs several years down the road. That has been the
problem to date. They cannot do it because they will be held
liable so they say, fine, we are not going to go on the site and
clean it up and take the risk.
If a contractor comes onto a site, he is responsible. If he
does what he is supposed to do, follows the plans as he is
supposed to, cleans it up and does it in good faith and we find
something later, he is not accountable. That is why this bill
will go so far toward moving us in the right direction, getting
these sites cleaned up.118
Senator Barbara Boxer, a Democrat from California, also endorsed the bill:
This bill includes liability relief for innocent parties.
These innocent parties are people who are interested in
cleaning up the brownfield site, but they are afraid to get
involved because they may become liable for somebody
else’s mess. Our bill makes it clear that innocent parties will
not be held liable under Superfund for the work they do on a
brownfield site. This provision alone should help reduce the
fear of developers and real estate interests, and it should lead
to more cleanups. This provision is certainly a strong reason
that a variety of business and real estate interests are strong
supporters of the bill. They want to come in; they want to
clean up the sites; but they don’t want to now become held
liable for past problems and then be hauled into court on a
Superfund case.119
In April 2001, the bill passed in the Senate with a vote of 99-0.120 In
December 2001, the Senate bill on brownfields was combined with a
House initiative to protect small businesses from CERCLA liability, and

the Bill would provide “important legal protections that will give developers, private and public, the
confidence to cleanup these toxic sites”).
117
GERRARD & GROSS, supra note 87, at 33–34.
118
147 CONG. REC. 6235 (2001) (statement of Sen. Smith) (emphasis added).
119
147 CONG. REC. 6241 (2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer) (emphasis added).
120
147 CONG. REC. 6257 (2001).
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121

passed in both houses of Congress.
President George W. Bush
enthusiastically signed the bill, citing the reluctance of developers to build
on brownfields as a cause of urban decline and suburban sprawl.122
B. Liability Protections Under the Brownfields Act
The Brownfields Act clarified the innocent landowner defense123 and
added two additional affirmative third party defenses: the bona fide
prospective purchaser defense124 and the contiguous landowner defense.125
The contiguous landowner defense is similar to the innocent landowner
defense in that it applies to landowners who “did not cause, contribute, or
consent to the release or threatened release” and who acquired their land
without knowing of the contamination.126 In contrast to the innocent
landowner defense, the hazardous material in question did not originate on
that parcel, it migrated in from offsite. In other words, the defense protects
“parties that are essentially victims of pollution incidents caused by their
neighbor’s actions.”127 In order to qualify under this defense, the
landowner must have conducted all appropriate inquiries128 into the history
of the site and not discovered the contamination before purchase.129
The bona fide prospective purchaser defense was provided specifically
to encourage brownfield redevelopment by shielding developers from
liability.130 This defense is available with respect to property acquired after
the Brownfields Act’s adoption on January 11, 2002.131 It may be used by
parties who, upon conducting all appropriate inquiries before purchasing
property, discover it to be contaminated.132 Under this defense, a “bona
fide prospective purchaser whose potential liability . . . is based solely on
the purchaser’s being considered to be an owner or operator of a facility
121

GERRARD & GROSS, supra note 87, at 33–34.
See George W. Bush, Remarks on Signing the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields
Revitalization Act in Conshohocken, Penn. (Jan. 11, 2002), available at http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=62694&st=brownfield&st1=.
123
See supra notes 86–96 and accompanying text.
124
42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2006).
125
42 U.S.C. § 9607(q) (2006). This codifies previously existing EPA policy not to take
enforcement action against landowners when the property was contaminated through passive migration.
See Policy Toward Owners of Property Containing Contaminated Aquifers, 60 Fed. Reg. 34,790 (July
3, 1995).
126
42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(1)(A)(i) (2006).
127
S. REP. NO. 107-2, at 10 (2001).
128
See infra notes 140–52 and accompanying text.
129
42 U.S.C. § 9607(q)(A)(1)(viii) (2006).
130
See supra notes 116–22 and accompanying text.
131
42 U.S.C. § 9601(40) (2006).
132
See Memorandum from Susan E. Bromm, Dir., Office of Site Remediation Enforcement, on
Interim Guidance Regarding Criteria Landowners Must Meet in Order to Qualify for Bona Fide
Prospective Purchaser, Contiguous Property Owner, or Innocent Landowner Limitations on CERCLA
Liability (“Common Elements”) to the Dirs., Adm’rs, and Regional Counsel of the EPA, 3 (Mar. 6,
2003), available at www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/common-elemguide.pdf [hereinafter Common Elements Memo].
122
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shall not be liable as long as the bona fide prospective purchaser does not
impede the performance of a response action or natural resource
restoration.”133 Significantly, in order to qualify for protection as a bona
fide prospective purchaser, the purchaser must show that “[a]ll disposal of
hazardous substances at the facility occurred before the person acquired the
facility.”134
C. Conditions to Liability Protection
By design, it is not easy to achieve liability protection under the
Brownfields Act. As Senator Boxer made clear, the Brownfields Act was
intended to “maintain ‘the polluter pays’ principle that underpins many of
our hazardous waste statutes.”135 Accordingly, liability protection is
conditioned upon a series of strict eligibility requirements. First, all three
classes of protected landowners must have conducted “all appropriate
inquiries” to assess the level of contamination of the site before purchasing
it.136 Secondly, they must take reasonable steps to (1) stop continuing
releases; (2) prevent threatened future releases; and (3) prevent or limit
human, environmental, or natural resource exposure to earlier hazardous
substance releases.137 Finally, all three types of protected landowners must
comply with continuing obligations in order to retain the defense against
CERCLA liability.138 The continuing obligations are meant to limit human
exposure to toxins and may include zoning changes or deed restrictions.139
The current standards defining “all appropriate inquiries” are quite
rigorous, and they must be followed by all parties seeking liability
protection on land purchased after January 11, 2002.140 All appropriate
133

42 U.S.C. § 9607(r)(1) (2006).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(40)(A) (2006).
147 CONG. REC. 6215, 6241 (2001) (statement of Sen. Boxer).
136
Common Elements Memo, supra note 132, at 10. The EPA stresses that all appropriate
inquiries must have been performed before purchase rather than after. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601(40)(B), 9607(q)(1)(A)(viii), 9601(35)(A)(i), 9601(35)(B)(i) (2006).
137
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(D), 9607(q)(1)(A)(iii), 9601(35)(B)(i)(II); Common Elements Memo,
supra note 132, at 9.
138
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(F), 9607(q)(1)(A)(v), 9601(35)(A); Common Elements Memo, supra
note 132, at 6.
139
Common Elements Memo, supra note 132, at 7.
140
The Brownfields Act directed the EPA to promulgate standards for all appropriate inquiries
and land transactions that occur after the date of the Brownfields Act’s passage (January 11, 2002) are
subject to this standard. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(B)(ii) (2006). The final standard went into effect on
November 1, 2006. Before the final rule went into effect, parties were required to follow standards set
forth by the American Society for Testing and Materials (“ASTM”) which were substantially similar.
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ALL APPROPRIATE INQUIRIES FINAL RULE FACT SHEET 1 (2005), available at
http://www.epa.gov/brownfields/aai/aai_final_factsheet.pdf. As the bona fide prospective purchaser
defense is only available with respect to land purchased after January 11, 2002, all bona fide
prospective purchasers are subject to the same standard for all appropriate inquiries. Parties asserting
an innocent landowner defense are subject to varying standards, depending on when the land in
question was purchased. See infra notes 147–49 and accompanying text.
134
135
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inquiries must be conducted by an “environmental professional”141 no
more than 180 days before the closing date of the sale.142 The
environmental professional must consider the past and present uses of the
property (including any use of hazardous materials), past and present waste
management practices on the site, and whether the area appears to be
contaminated upon inspection.143 Information may be collected by
interviewing past and present owners and neighbors, and consulting old
phone books, fire insurance maps, property records, and other sources.144
The environmental professional will identify “data gaps” in his report, and
while a more thorough investigation may be advisable, it is not mandated
by the “all appropriate inquiries” standard.145 It is important, however, to
conduct a thorough inquiry, because an incomplete inquiry into the history
of the parcel will not protect the owner from liability.146
For landowners seeking to establish an innocent landowner defense
with respect to property purchased before the enactment of the Brownfields
Act, the standards for all appropriate inquiries are somewhat looser.147 For
property purchased before May 31, 1997, a court would consider
commonly known information about the property, the defendant’s
specialized knowledge or experience, the “obviousness of the presence or
likely presence of contamination at the property,” and other factors.148
With respect to property purchased on or after May 31, 1997, but before
the promulgation of the final rule discussed above, procedures outlined by
the American Society for Testing and Materials fulfill the requirements.149
These procedures are similar to the final rule for all appropriate inquiries.
Regardless of when the land was purchased, landowners must also take

141
An “environmental professional” is “a person who possesses sufficient specific education,
training, and experience necessary to exercise professional judgment to develop opinions and
conclusions regarding conditions indicative of releases or threatened releases . . . on, at, in, or to a
property, sufficient to meet the objectives and performance factors in § 312.20(e) and (f).” 40 C.F.R. §
312.10 (2005); Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 70 Fed. Reg. 66,070, 66,108
(Nov. 1, 2005).
142
Standards and Practices for All Appropriate Inquiries, 70 Fed. Reg. at 66,083.
143
Id. at 66,087.
144
Id. at 66,088–89.
145
Mangone, supra note 96, at 36.
146
Unfortunately, this standard, like so many in CERCLA, is frustratingly vague. See Weiler,
supra note 96, at 182 (noting that “it is still unclear whether acknowledgment of data gaps can impact
the validity of an AAI”).
147
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(B)(iv)(I) (2006); see also R.E. Goodson Constr. Co. v. Int’l Paper Co.,
No. 4:02-4184-RBH, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42909, at *43–44 (D.S.C. Oct. 13, 2005) (finding that the
sufficiency of a party’s inquiries into the site must be judged with reference to the time period in which
they occurred, because “[a]ny other finding would hold landowners to the impossibly high standard of
complying with current perceptions of appropriateness in an area where perceptions change quickly”).
148
42 U.S.C. § 9601 (35)(B)(iv)(I).
149
Id. § 9601 (35)(B)(iv)(II); see also ASTM STANDARD E1527-97, STANDARD PRACTICE FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT: PHASE 1 ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENT PROCESS (1997),
available at http://www.astm.org/DATABASE.CART/HISTORICAL/E1527-97.htm.
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150

reasonable steps with respect to contaminants on their property.
The
EPA has interpreted this language as a congressional attempt to ensure
environmental protection while declining to impose the same standards on
protected landowners as on potentially responsible parties.151 The EPA
guidance also emphasizes that “[t]he required reasonable steps relate only
to responding to contamination for which the [party] . . . is not responsible.
Activities on the property subsequent to purchase that result in new
contamination can give rise to full CERCLA liability.”152
While the “reasonable steps” requirement uses the same language for
all classes of protected landowners, the EPA notes that the three classes of
landowners may be held to different standards as a reflection of their
Since bona fide prospective purchasers
different circumstances.153
acquired the land with knowledge of the contamination, and therefore with
a more complete understanding of the hazardous substances that must be
controlled, they may be held to a higher standard. As yet there has been
very little judicial interpretation of the “reasonable steps” standard. The
EPA notes, however, that “the existing case law on due care provides a
reference point for evaluating the reasonable steps requirement.”154
The “due care” standard ensures that parties who do not take action,
allowing the environmental situation on their property to get worse, will
not be afforded protected landowner status. The Sixth Circuit, in Franklin
County Convention Facilities Authority v. American Premier
Underwriters, Inc., provides an instructive example of how the innocent
landowner defense can be lost through conduct that does not constitute
“due care.”155 The plaintiff, Franklin County Convention Facilities
Authority (“CFA”), leased property near railroads in Columbus, Ohio for
the purpose of constructing a convention center.156 Buried on the property
was a large wooden box which had been constructed some time prior to
1901 to treat wood for use as railroad ties.157 No records of the box
existed, and it had not been discovered in the course of three
environmental assessments of the property.158 In October 1990, a
contractor accidentally split the box open with a backhoe, releasing the
150

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601(40)(D), 9607(q)(1)(A)(iii), 9601(35)(B)(i)(II) (2006).
Common Elements Memo, supra note 132, at 9. The EPA guidance points out that because
bona fide prospective purchasers knew of the contamination before purchasing the land, but innocent
landowners and contiguous landowners did not, bona fide prospective purchasers might need to take
more action to satisfy the “reasonable steps” requirement. Id. at 10.
152
Id. at 11.
153
Id. at 10.
154
Id. at 11.
155
Franklin County Convention Facilities Auth. v. Amer. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d
534 (6th Cir. 2001).
156
Id. at 539.
157
Id.
158
Id.
151
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159

benzene and creosote that the box contained.
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found that
CFA was an innocent landowner, and the defendant appealed.160 The Sixth
Circuit rejected the district court’s determination that CFA was an innocent
landowner on the grounds that it had not exercised due care with respect to
the contamination.161 While CFA stopped work and alerted authorities
when the box was discovered, it did not take adequate steps to prevent the
contamination from spreading.162 Contaminants were allowed to migrate a
distance of forty-five feet along an open sewer, and an adequate barrier
was not erected until more than a year after the spill.163 CFA’s failure to
take due care to prevent the spread of contamination proved fatal to its
attempt to use the innocent landowner defense.
While some commentators have argued that the Brownfields Act does
not go far enough to protect human health,164 it hardly gives polluters a free
pass. Due to the strict eligibility requirements and the ambiguity in many
of those requirements, it may even be too difficult to establish a protected
landowner defense.165 In addition to all of the conditions described above,
a party is ineligible for the protected landowner defenses if disposal
occurred during his ownership period.166 The remainder of this Note
discusses the problematic definition of “disposal” in CERCLA case law.
IV. THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD “DISPOSAL”
As a party seeking to establish liability protection as an innocent
landowner or bona fide prospective purchaser, the landowner must show
by a preponderance of the evidence that all disposal occurred before he
acquired the property.167 Thus, the exact meaning of “disposal” is critical.
159

Id.
Id.
161
Id. at 548. The court did not reverse CFA’s designation as an innocent landowner simply
because its construction activities had lead to the breaking of the box. “First, we note that CFA played
no role in placing the hazardous substance at the site, nor could have reasonably been aware of the
box’s presence. Moreover, even though CFA’s contractor split open the box, this was accidental and
unavoidable, and cannot fairly be attributed to CFA.” Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.
164
See, e.g., Seth Schofield, Note, In Search of the Institution in Institutional Controls: The
Failure of the Small Business Liability Relief and Brownfields Revitalization Act of 2002 and the Need
for Federal Legislation, 12 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 946, 1020 (2005).
165
See Stanley A. Millan, Contemporary CERCLA: Reversals of Fortune and Black Holes, 16
FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 183, 204 (2005); Timothy Harmon & Karen Williams, Brownfields
Revitalization Act: Big Promises Not Delivered in New Brownfields Law, ENVIRONS (Lane Powell
Spears Lubersky LLP, Seattle, Wash.), Summer 2002, at 2.
166
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), 9601(40)(A) (2006).
167
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A), 9601(40)(A). By definition, contiguous property owners own land
that was contaminated by waste migrating in from off-site, rather than being disposed of on-site. 42
U.S.C. § 9607(q) (2006). Therefore, the definition of disposal is not significant with respect to
contiguous landowners, so that defense will not be analyzed in this section.
160
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“Disposal” is defined by CERCLA as the “discharge, deposit, injection,
dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid waste or hazardous
waste into or on any land or water.”168 The federal courts disagree as to
which factual scenarios would constitute “disposal” and which would not,
so the same course of events may lead to CERCLA liability in some
jurisdictions but not others.
The term “disposal” does not just describe the initial introduction of
contaminants to a site, but also any spreading of the contaminants that may
have been caused by human activity.169 Disposal is not a “one-time
occurrence—there may be other disposals when hazardous materials are
moved, dispersed, or released during landfill excavations and fillings.”170
For example, in Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc.,
the Fifth Circuit held a residential developer liable under CERCLA for
spreading creosote-contaminated soil during site grading.171 The question,
therefore, is what degree of human activity is required in order for the
spread of contaminants to constitute disposal?
As the Ninth Circuit explained, the various “opinions cannot be
shoehorned into the dichotomy of a classic circuit split. Rather, a careful
reading of their holdings suggests a more nuanced range of views,
depending in large part on the factual circumstances of the case.”172 The
holdings of the various federal courts can, however, be broadly
categorized. Commentators point to the distinction between active and
passive disposal,173 but it is most helpful to discuss the issue in terms of
three categories of situations. In the first category, which this Note shall
refer to as “active disposal,” contaminants are introduced to or moved
around the site through active human conduct. Such a situation clearly
constitutes disposal under CERCLA.174 On the other end of the spectrum
168
42 U.S.C. § 9601(29), which refers to the definition of “disposal” in the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6903(3) (2006).
169
Liability may attach even if contaminants are spread through a benign activity such as soil
testing. See generally Jennifer L. Scheller, Note, No Good Deed Goes Unpunished: The CERCLA
Liability Exposure Unfortunately Created by Pre-acquisition Soil Testing, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1930
(2005) (discussing how soil testing can lead to liability exposure).
170
Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1573 (5th Cir. 1988);
see also United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 719 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 6903(3), ‘disposal’ is defined in part as the ‘discharge’ or ‘placing’ of waste ‘into or on any land or
water.’ ‘Disposal’ thus includes not only the initial introduction of contaminants onto a property but
also the spreading of contaminants due to subsequent activity.”); Redwing Carriers v. Saraland
Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1510 (11th Cir. 1996) (“[W]e do not read CERCLA’s definition of
‘disposal’ as being limited to instances where a hazardous substance is initially introduced into the
environment at a facility.”); Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Catellus Dev. Corp., 976 F.2d 1338,
1342 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Congress did not limit the term [disposal] to the initial introduction of hazardous
material onto property.”).
171
Tanglewood E. Homeowners, 849 F.2d at 1571.
172
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 875 (9th Cir. 2001).
173
See, e.g., Starr, supra note 23, at 446.
174
As courts typically interpret CERCLA’s provisions broadly, any active human conduct that
could fairly be considered the “discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of
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is a situation which this Note shall refer to as “migration,” in which
contaminants move within the environment through natural means (as
when liquid percolates through the soil, or contaminants migrate within a
landfill). The courts of appeals that have commented on the issue have
held that migration does not constitute disposal.175
It is an intermediate scenario, which this Note shall refer to as “passive
leaking,” that presents the greatest analytical difficulties. In this scenario,
contaminants move through passive means from some sort of man-made
containment into the environment (as when contaminants leak from a
drum). The courts disagree as to whether passive leaking constitutes
disposal. The Fourth Circuit has held that it does176 and the Sixth Circuit
has held that it does not.177 The Second,178 Third,179 and Ninth180 Circuits
have not directly commented on the issue, but have suggested that they
would agree with the Fourth Circuit.
When contaminants migrate through completely natural means, this
movement does not constitute disposal. For example, the natural
movement of waste within a landfill was held by the Third Circuit not to
constitute disposal in United States v. CDMG Realty Co.181 Dowell owned
the property for six years and did not use it (except to perform
environmental testing) then sold it to another party.182 The later owner
sued Dowell for remediation costs, claiming that as waste tends to migrate
within landfills, Dowell had owned the site at the time of disposal.183 The
court examined the words used to define disposal under CERCLA and
found that while the words “leaking” and “spilling” have passive
meanings, they “should be read to require affirmative human action” in this
context.184 To reinforce its conclusion, the court asserted that the innocent
landowner defense would be a nullity if passive migration constituted

any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water” would be held to constitute disposal.
See infra Part V.A.
175
See infra notes 181–92 and accompanying text.
176
Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001); Nurad, Inc.
v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 846 (4th Cir. 1992); see also infra notes 193–206 and
accompanying text.
177
United States v. 150 Acres of Land, 204 F.3d 698, 705 (6th Cir. 2000); see also infra notes
208–12 and accompanying text.
178
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem., Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 178 (2d Cir. 2003); see also
infra notes 219–20 and accompanying text.
179
United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 711 (3d Cir. 1996); see also infra notes 214–
18 and accompanying text.
180
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp, 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2001); see also infra
notes 221–24 and accompanying text.
181
CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 711.
182
Id. at 711–12.
183
Id. at 712.
184
See id. at 714 (“The words surrounding ‘leaking’ and ‘spilling’—‘discharge,’ ‘deposit,’
‘injection,’ ‘dumping,’ and ‘placing’—all envision a human actor.”).
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185

disposal.
As the innocent landowner defense only applies if the owner
acquired the property after disposal occurred, the defense would be nearly
impossible to use if gradual spreading of contamination constituted
disposal.186
The Second Circuit explicitly adopted the Third Circuit’s reasoning the
following year.187 In 2003, the Second Circuit again addressed passive
migration and discussed disposal by “leaking” in more detail.188 A
business called Tar Asphalt Services cleaned its trucks with kerosene and
allowed the tar and kerosene runoff to flow onto a neighboring property
called Niagara Flats.189 The court held that the then-owner of Niagara
Flats, Mohawk Valley Oil, was not liable under CERCLA as an owner at
the time of “disposal.”190 As the Second Circuit does not recognize purely
passive migration as disposal, there was no disposal on the Niagara Flats
property.191 The court noted, however, that the passive migration of
contaminants from a container into the environment could constitute
disposal under CERCLA.192
In Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., the Fourth Circuit
specifically confronted the issue of leaky underground storage tanks, and
decided that a leak from a drum does constitute disposal.193 Nurad is cited
as the bedrock case defining “disposal” in a passive way.194 Nurad was the
current owner of a site which had incurred remediation costs in removing
leaky underground tanks of mineral oil.195 It brought suit against several
previous owners for contribution, including Mumaw, from whom it had
bought the property.196 The district court found that Mumaw was not liable
since he had not owned the site “at the time of disposal”—at the time the
tanks were buried.197 The court of appeals rejected the district court’s
185

Id. at 716.
Id.
ABB Indus. Sys., Inc. v. Prime Tech., Inc., 120 F.3d 351, 358 (2d Cir. 1997).
188
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chem., Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 178–79 (2d Cir. 2003).
189
Id. at 174.
190
Id. at 179.
191
Id. at 178.
192
Id.
193
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 840–41, 845 (4th Cir. 1992).
194
While not all of these cases agree with the Fourth Circuit, Nurad’s definition of “disposal” is
cited in numerous cases, including ABB Industrial Systems, Inc. v. Prime Technology, Inc., 120 F.3d
351, 358 n.3 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d 706, 713 (3d Cir. 1996);
Joslyn Manufacturing Co. v. Koppers Co., 40 F.3d 750, 761–62 (5th Cir. 1994); Sycamore Industrial
Park Associates v. Ericsson, Inc., No. 06-C-0768, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23881, at *8 (N.D. Ill. Mar.
30, 2007); Spectrum International Holdings, Inc. v. Universal Cooperatives, Inc., Civil No. 04-99,
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49716, at *19–20 (D. Minn. July 17, 2006); City of Bangor v. Citizens
Communications Co., Civil No. 02-183-B-S, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3845, at *40 (D. Me. Mar. 11,
2004); and Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme, Inc., 169 F. Supp. 2d 695, 730 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
195
Nurad, 966 F.2d at 840–41.
196
Id.
197
Id. at 841 (internal quotation omitted). The decision was appealed by Nurad and by another
defendant, Hooper, whom the court found had been the owner at the time of disposal. Id.
186
187
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active construction of “disposal,” saying that “a requirement conditioning
liability upon affirmative human participation in contamination . . .
frustrates the statutory purpose.”198 The court found that Mumaw was
liable as a former owner because he had not “overcome the presumption”
that the tanks had leaked steadily over time, including the period in which
he had owned the land.199
The Fourth Circuit elaborated upon its position on leaking drums in
Crofton Ventures Ltd. Partnership v. G & H Partnership.200 Plaintiff
Crofton had purchased a parcel of land from the defendants, who had
represented in the sale contract that the property had not been
contaminated with any hazardous substances.201 When Crofton began to
develop the site in 1995, he discovered 285 fully or partially buried fiftyfive-gallon drums containing asphalt and trichloroethylene in addition to
“truck tires, household appliances, and other similar refuse.”202 Crofton
remediated the site and sued the previous owners to recover his costs.203
The district court analyzed the issue of liability in terms of who had placed
the drums in question on the site.204 It found that since there was no
evidence that the defendants had “placed” the contaminants on the site,
they were not liable.205 The court of appeals reversed, holding that under
42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(2) an owner or operator may be held liable for
contamination if he was the owner or operator “at the time when hazardous
waste was either placed on the site or leaked into the environment from a
source on the site, whether or not such owner or operator was the cause of
the disposal or, indeed, even had knowledge of it.”206 Several district
courts have also concluded or suggested that when contaminants leak from
drums on a site, even without human intervention, “disposal” has
occurred.207
The Sixth Circuit, occupying the opposite end of the spectrum, adopted
an active definition of disposal in United States v. 150 Acres of Land.208
198

Id. at 845.
Id. at 846.
200
258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001).
201
Id. at 294.
202
Id.
203
Id. at 295.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 296.
206
Id. at 297.
207
See, e.g., Servco Pac., Inc. v. Dods, 193 F. Supp. 2d 1183, 1197 (D. Haw. 2002) (stating that
Ninth Circuit precedent dictates that “‘disposal’ does not include general gradual passive migration of
contamination through the soil” but does include “passive gradual ‘leaking’ such as that from an
underground storage tank with a hole in it or from an abandoned barrel”); Southfund Partners III v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 57 F. Supp. 2d 1369, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 1999) (holding that “the term ‘disposal’
includes the leaking and spilling of hazardous materials from an uncapped tank caused by rainwater
displacing the hazardous materials”); In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 108 B.R. 378, 382 (Bankr. D.
Mass. 1989) (holding that the leaking of drums over time constituted disposal).
208
204 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2000).
199
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The defendant owners had inherited land without knowing that there were
hundreds of drums of toxic substances on the parcel, hidden by dense
vegetation.209 The EPA began removal actions and sued the landowners
for contribution, and the owners asserted the innocent landowner defense.
The court reasoned that “because ‘disposal’ is defined primarily in terms of
active words such as injection, deposit, and placing, the potentially passive
words ‘spilling’ and ‘leaking’ should be interpreted actively.”210
Therefore, the court concluded that without “evidence that there was
human activity involved in whatever movement of hazardous substances
occurred on the property,” the defendants had not “disposed” of hazardous
substances.211 The following year, the court reiterated its opinion that
“disposal” requires active human conduct in Bob’s Beverage, Inc. v. Acme,
Inc.212 A few other courts have adopted a similarly active construction of
disposal.213
In United States v. CDMG Realty Co.,214 the Third Circuit held that
migration does not constitute disposal,215 but suggested that passive leaking
may.
While declining to conclude “whether the movement of
contaminants unaided by human conduct can ever constitute ‘disposal,’”216
the court distinguished between leaking and migration. The court stated
that while the word “leaking” implied passive movement of contaminants,
it was inapplicable to the case at bar because the waste was not leaking out
of any containment.217 The court noted, however, that the word “leaking”
“would encompass the escape of waste through a hole in a drum.”218
Similarly, the Second Circuit suggested that a leaking drum would
constitute “disposal” in Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chemical,
Inc.219 The court stated that while “leaking” implied passive movement of
contaminants, it was inapplicable in that case because “[leaking] denotes
the passage of a substance into or out of a containment.”220 Therefore,
both the Second and Third Circuits would likely find that the passive
leaking of a drum or other containment does constitute disposal.
209

Id. at 701.
Id. at 706.
211
Id.
212
264 F.3d 692, 697–98 (6th Cir. 2001).
213
See, e.g., City of Bangor v. Citizens Commc’ns Co., No. 02-183-B-S, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
3845, at *40 (D. Me. Mar. 11, 2004) (noting that all the terms used to define “disposal” “suggest some
new introduction of hazardous substances to the environment”); Bethlehem Iron Works, Inc. v. Lewis
Indus., Inc., No. 94-0752, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14446, at *132 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 19, 1996) (holding
that “the term ‘disposal’ must be interpreted to require taking an affirmative act to get rid of waste”).
214
96 F.3d 706 (3d Cir. 1996).
215
See supra notes 181–86 and accompanying text.
216
CDMG Realty Co., 96 F.3d at 711.
217
Id. at 714.
218
Id.
219
315 F.3d 171 (2d Cir. 2003).
220
Id. at 178. “[A] property line itself is not a containment, certainly not for liquids.” Id.
210
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The Ninth Circuit, in Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. Unocal Corp.,
rejected rigid rules, instead opting to determine whether disposal had
occurred on a case-by-case basis.221 “Instead of focusing solely on whether
the terms are ‘active’ or ‘passive,’ we must examine each of the terms in
relation to the facts of the case and determine whether the movement of
contaminants is, under the plain meaning of the terms, a ‘disposal.’”222
The court examined the situation, which had involved passive migration of
tar and slag, and found that it could not fairly be characterized as a
“discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing.”223
The court noted that Congress had intended the word “leaking” to refer to a
“leaking barrel or underground storage tank,” strongly suggesting that the
court would disagree with the Sixth Circuit and find passively leaking
drums to constitute “disposal.”224
V. RECONCILING THE DEFINITIONS OF “DISPOSAL”
A. “Disposal” and Legislative Intent Under CERCLA
As Part IV shows, several of the courts of appeals would likely agree
that when contaminants passively move from a man-made container into
the environment a disposal may have occurred under CERCLA, whether or
not the landowner knew that there had been any leaking or spilling. This
definition of “disposal” is consistent with CERLCA’s legislative purpose.
CERCLA was enacted to clean up the nation’s hazardous waste sites, and
to make the polluters pay for the cleanup.225 In order to effectuate this
goal, “Congress cast the liability net wide to capture all potentially
responsible parties.”226 Courts have been mindful of this congressional
goal, holding that due to CERCLA’s comprehensive remedial intent, courts
are bound to “construe its provisions liberally to avoid frustrating the
legislature’s purpose.”227
221

Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 879 (9th Cir. 2001).
Id. Like the Ninth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit declined to make strict rules on what
constitutes disposal. In a case involving the alleged spread of contamination during excavation, the
Eleventh Circuit stated, “Instead of parsing the language of this definition to arrive at a rigid rule for
when conduct results in a ‘disposal,’ courts should look at the definition of ‘disposal’ in its entirety in
ascertaining whether a particular event qualifies as such.” Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apartments,
94 F.3d 1489, 1510 (11th Cir. 1996).
223
Carson Harbor, 270 F.3d at 879.
224
Id.; see also supra notes 208–13 and accompanying text.
225
See, e.g., Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chi. v. N. Am. Galvanizing & Coatings,
Inc., 473 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2007).
226
Horsehead Indus., Inc. v. Paramount Commc’ns, Inc., 258 F.3d 132, 135 (3d Cir. 2001).
227
Westfarm Assocs. Ltd. P’ship v. Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 66 F.3d 669, 677 (4th
Cir. 1995); see also Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167, 1172 (10th Cir. 2004); Atl.
Richfield Co. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 98 F.3d 564, 570 (10th Cir. 1996); United States v. Aceto Agric.
Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1380 (8th Cir. 1989); United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810
F.2d 726, 743 (8th Cir. 1986).
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The case law concerning the definition of “facility” provides an
instructive example of a broad definition under CERCLA. The Fourth
Circuit held that a publicly owned sewer system was a “facility” under
CERCLA because such an interpretation is more consistent with the
legislative purpose.228 The defendant, Washington Suburban Sanitary
Commission (“WSSC”), had allowed its sewer pipes to deteriorate, which
let chemical waste from a dry cleaner seep into the environment.229
WSSC’s defense was based on the idea that its sewer was not a “facility”
under CERCLA. WSSC argued that since RCRA and the Clean Water Act
each permit the discharge of certain chemicals into sewers, Congress could
not have intended for sewer operators to be liable for contaminants leaking
from the sewers.230 The court noted that Congress probably did not
envision sewer systems as badly deteriorated as the one in question, and
then turned to the legislative purposes of the various statutory schemes.231
The court concluded that “CERCLA is a comprehensive remedial statutory
scheme, and as such, the courts must construe its provisions liberally to
avoid frustrating the legislature’s purpose.”232 Accordingly, the court
interpreted CERCLA’s liability provisions broadly and found the sewer to
be a facility under CERCLA.233
In Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., the Tenth Circuit relied even
more explicitly on CERCLA’s legislative intent in broadly construing the
definition of “facility.”234 The site in question was a hog farm in
Oklahoma, owned by Seaboard, which was divided into two contiguous
parcels, Dorman North and Dorman South.235 The Sierra Club argued that,
taken together as one facility, the farm discharged enough ammonia that it
was subject to CERCLA’s reporting provisions.236 Seaboard argued that
each of the barns, waste lagoons, and other components of the farm was a
separate facility, and as such that it was only required to report a discharge
if emissions from one particular component of the farm exceeded the
specified level.237 The court first examined the definition of “facility”
under CERCLA,238 finding that it was unambiguous and thus not subject to
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Westfarm Assocs., 66 F.3d at 679.
Id. at 674.
230
Id. at 679.
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Id.
232
Id. at 677 (citations omitted).
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Id. at 679.
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Sierra Club v. Seaboard Farms, Inc., 387 F.3d 1167, 1172–73 (10th Cir. 2004).
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Id. at 1168.
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Id. at 1168–69.
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Id. at 1169.
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Id. at 1170 (“‘(A) any building, structure . . . pit, pond, lagoon, impoundment, ditch . . . or (B)
any site or area where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of, or placed, or
otherwise come to be located . . . .’” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 9601(9) (2000))).
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239

Chevron deference.
Citing CERCLA’s broad remedial purpose, the
court held that its legislative aims were “best served through treating the
Dorman Farm as a single facility.”240 Thus, when there is a question as to
whether a party is potentially liable under CERCLA, courts are quite likely
to conclude that the party is indeed liable.
Furthermore, a definition of disposal that requires affirmative human
conduct would encourage “indifference to environmental hazards.”241 In
Nurad, the Fourth Circuit argued that under an active definition of
“disposal,” an “owner could avoid liability simply by standing idle while
an environmental hazard festers on his property.”242 The court reasoned
that if Nurad was liable as a current owner of contaminated property under
Shore Realty, it would be unfair to allow Mumaw to escape liability, given
that neither party was actually at fault for the contamination.243 If such a
situation were allowed, the court reasoned, it would discourage voluntary
cleanups.244
The Ninth Circuit shared similar reasoning in Carson Harbor, noting
that “if ‘disposal’ is interpreted to exclude all passive migration, there
would be little incentive for a landowner to examine his property for
decaying disposal tanks, prevent them from spilling or leaking, or to clean
up contamination once it was found.”245 Given that CERCLA’s purpose is
to remediate contaminated sites and prevent human exposure to toxins,
Congress must not have meant to reward owners who remain willfully
ignorant of the environmental conditions on their land. Therefore, the
prevalent view that “disposal” includes passive leaking from a drum or
underground storage tank (though not migration through the soil) is more
appropriate in light of CERCLA’s legislative purpose.
B. “Disposal” and Legislative Intent Under the Brownfields Act
While the active definition of “disposal” embraced by the Sixth Circuit
is inconsistent with the larger CERCLA scheme, it is more consistent with
the legislative intent of the Brownfields Act than the passive definition
used by other circuits. The purpose of the Brownfields Act was to combat
the problem of vacant industrial land, the redevelopment of which had
been discouraged by CERCLA’s expansive liability scheme.246 The
Brownfields Act creates a liability shield, so it makes little sense to apply a
239
Id. at 1170–71. For a discussion of the Chevron case, see infra notes 262–65 and
accompanying text.
240
Id. at 1174.
241
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845–46 (4th Cir. 1992).
242
Id. at 845.
243
Id. at 845–46.
244
Id.
245
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 881 (9th Cir. 2001).
246
See supra notes 116–22 and accompanying text.
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definition of disposal that was designed to be a liability hook. While the
Fourth and Ninth Circuits point out that an active definition of disposal
encourages willful ignorance,247 the eligibility requirements248 for the
protected landowners prevent that from becoming an issue.
The eligibility requirements for gaining liability protection would be
nonsensical if the passive definition of disposal was applied. With regard
to the “due care” requirement of the innocent landowner defense,249 the
U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas noted that innocent
landowners cannot, by definition, exercise due care with respect to
contamination that they do not know is there.250 To qualify as an innocent
landowner, an entity must “make all appropriate inquiries prior to
purchasing a piece of property and lack actual knowledge of the pollution
at the time of purchase; then, whenever the landowner subsequently
discovers the contamination, he must take reasonable steps to control the
problem as prescribed in [section] (35)(B)(i)(II).”251 A landowner cannot
earn protection for taking due care with respect to a leaky drum if he
becomes strictly liable merely on the basis of the drum’s existence. The
“reasonable steps” standard to which bona fide prospective purchasers are
to be held presents the same problem. If Congress had intended for
undiscovered, ongoing leaks to automatically defeat a protected landowner
defense, the “due care” and “reasonable steps” standards would be
meaningless.
The language of an EPA guidance document commonly known as the
“Common Elements” memo suggests that the EPA does not consider a
hidden ongoing leak to be an automatic bar to protected status.252 One of
the questions in the “Question and Answer” section asks whether a
property owner who has discovered that “the containment system for an
on-site waste pile has been breached” would be required by the
“reasonable steps” standard to repair the breach.253 The EPA replied that,
ordinarily, a protected landowner would be required to stop continuing
releases, and does not hint at the notion that contaminants leaking from a
man-made containment could defeat a protected landowner defense in
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See supra notes 241–45 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 135–66 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 155–63 and accompanying text.
250
City of Wichita v. Trs. of the Apco Oil Corp. Liquidating Trust, 306 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1051
(D. Kan. 2003); see also 1325 “G” St. Assocs. v. Rockwood Pigments NA, Inc., No. DKC 2002-1622,
2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19178, at *28–29 (D. Md. Sept. 7, 2004) (holding that the due care requirement
arises only upon discovery of the hazardous substances).
251
City of Wichita, 306 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.
252
See Common Elements Memo, supra note 132, Attachment B, Reasonable Steps Questions
and Answers, at 2 (discussing scenarios that could lead to strict liability in several circuits without
acknowledging that liability could attach).
253
Id.
248
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254

several federal circuits.
Surely Congress could not have intended for
bona fide prospective purchasers to be strictly liable for a breach in a
containment system created by another party. Yet depending on how a
court applied the requirement that all disposal occurred before the bona
fide purchaser acquired the property, a hidden continuous leak could defeat
the bona fide prospective purchaser protections.
Even if the protected landowner defenses are not conditioned on
disposal having occurred before the party acquired the property, the
existing requirements provide more than sufficient protection to the
environment. Given the due care/reasonable steps conditions imposed on
protected landowners, a landowner cannot “avoid liability simply by
standing idle while an environmental hazard festers on his property.”255
The “all appropriate inquiries”256 standard provides ample incentive for site
investigation, contradicting the Ninth Circuit’s assertion that “if ‘disposal’
is interpreted to exclude all passive migration, there would be little
incentive for a landowner to examine his property for decaying disposal
tanks, prevent them from spilling or leaking, or to clean up contamination
once it was found.”257 These standards, and the others imposed on
protected landowners,258 ensure that the environment is protected and that
only truly non-culpable parties reap the benefits of the protected landowner
defenses.
C. Reconciling the Two Definitions of “Disposal”
Ideally, Congress would clarify the meaning of disposal, and specify
that the protected landowner defenses are held to the less stringent
standard. Failing that, this Note urges the EPA to promulgate a rule
clarifying its interpretation of the word “disposal,” adopting a passive
definition when determining who is a PRP, and an active definition when
examining whether a landowner may take advantage of one of the
defenses. The EPA has the discretion to interpret ambiguous statutory
directives, and such a complex circuit split over the meaning of disposal
shows a high degree of ambiguity.
The EPA has the authority to give the word “disposal” one meaning
when applied to protected landowners and a different one when applied to
254

Id.; see also Crofton Ventures Ltd. P’ship v. G & H P’ship, 258 F.3d 292, 297 (4th Cir. 2001)
(noting that a landowner may be held liable for contamination if he was the owner “at the time when
hazardous waste was either placed on the site or leaked into the environment from a source on the site,
whether or not such owner or operator was the cause of the disposal or, indeed, even had knowledge of
it”); supra notes 176–224 and accompanying text.
255
Nurad, Inc. v. William E. Hooper & Sons Co., 966 F.2d 837, 845–46 (4th Cir. 1992).
256
See supra notes 140–49 and accompanying text.
257
Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. Unocal Corp., 270 F.3d 863, 881 (9th Cir. 2001).
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There are other conditions imposed on protected landowners that this Note will not address.
See Common Elements Memo, supra note 132.
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PRPs generally. While the same term is generally interpreted as having the
same meaning throughout a statutory scheme, the Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed the EPA’s right to give the same term, in the same statutory
scheme, different meanings. In the 2007 case Environmental Defense v.
Duke Energy Corp., the Supreme Court examined the EPA’s differing
interpretations of the word “modification” in two different parts of the
Clean Air Act.259 Two of the Clean Air Act’s programs, Prevention of
Significant Deterioration (“PSD”) and New Source Performance Standards
(“NSPS”), looked to changes in emissions to determine whether a change
to a facility constituted a “modification” that would require new permits.
The EPA used annual emissions to determine whether a modification of
the source had occurred under PSD, while it used hourly emissions under
NSPS.260 The Supreme Court upheld the EPA’s varying definitions of the
term modification because of the differencing regulatory goals of the
statutory sections in question.261 As this Note has shown, the legislative
goals behind the Brownfields Act were quite different from the legislative
goals that inspired CERCLA’s original passage.
The EPA’s varying interpretations of the word “disposal” would be
entitled to judicial deference, provided they were reasonable. The
landmark administrative law case Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense
Council laid out the two-step process for determining the level of judicial
deference that is appropriate.262 First, the court must determine whether
Congress has “directly spoken to the precise question at issue.”263 If it has,
courts and agencies must give effect to Congress’s intent.264 Here, the
circuit split over the meaning of the word “disposal” demonstrates that
there is ambiguity. When a statute is ambiguous, the court will defer to the
reasonable interpretation of the administrative agency tasked with
implementing the statute.265 Given the level of ambiguity, and the
differing statutory goals, it would be highly reasonable for the EPA to give
the word “disposal” different meanings in the two different contexts.
VI. CONCLUSION
CERCLA was enacted in 1980 to address a problem that was visible at
that time: toxic waste sites leaching their contaminants into the
259

Envtl. Def. v. Duke Energy Corp., 549 U.S. 561, 576 (2007).
Id. at 569.
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Id. at 566. For a detailed discussion of Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corp., see
generally Benjamin E. Edwards, Comment, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy Corporation, 33
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 197 (2008); Shawn Eisele, Comment, Environmental Defense v. Duke Energy
Corp.: Paving the Way for Cap and Trade?, 35 ECOLOGY L.Q. 363 (2008).
262
Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
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environment and harming people and ecosystems. While CERCLA has led
to the remediation of a great number of sites, it has had unintended
consequences and arguably exacerbated the problem of brownfields. By
the time the Brownfields Act was passed, contaminated land was the
subject of completely different political and policy concerns. The crisis
was no longer waste seeping into basements; it was acres of urban land
sitting vacant. Congress, in making the bona fide prospective purchaser
defense available, intended to provide a liability shield to parties willing to
redevelop brownfields. This liability shield is only available where
disposal of contaminants ceased before the party purchased the property,
and given the courts of appeals’ very different interpretations of the term
“disposal,” the usefulness of the liability shield is unclear.
Given the ambiguity surrounding the term “disposal,” the definition of
the term should be clarified. If there is no “iron rule” requiring that the
EPA give the same word exactly the same meaning in different statutory
contexts,266 the EPA should adopt differing definitions for potentially
responsible parties and protected landowners, reflecting the different
statutory goals.
The legislative goals behind CERCLA and the
Brownfields Act were quite different, reflecting the different conditions of
the times. While the expansive definition of disposal fits CERCLA’s
original intent, the intent of the Brownfields Act should be respected as
well.
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